TURMEL: Appeal of Vexatious Litigant Label Denied JCT: The arguments why I'm not a vexatious litigant are in my Appeal Memorandum at: http://SmartestMan.Ca/s4008.txt The appeal was heard on Sep 26 2023 at Toronto. This is the S.40 from the Federal Court Act: Vexatious proceedings 40 (1) If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court. JCT: So "no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court" should mean others may. (2) An application under subsection (1) may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, who is entitled to be heard on the application and on any application made under subsection (3). Application for rescission or leave to proceed (3) A person against whom a court has made an order under subsection (1) may apply to the court for rescission of the order or for leave to institute or continue a proceeding. Court may grant leave JCT: Rescission: revocation, cancellation of a law, order.. So I can ask to have the order struck down next time I have to do a fight in Federal Court. If no, then seek leave to appeal. (4) If an application is made to a court under subsection (3) for leave to institute or continue a proceeding, the court may grant leave if it is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding. No appeal (5) A decision of the court under subsection (4) is final and is not subject to appeal. JCT: Fine. All my issues were of national importance and any new one will have to be proven an abuse of process without reasonable grounds for proceeding. One at a time, all my issues were reasonable. All together, they may conclude like this decision: Date: 20230928 Docket: A-265-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 197 CORAM: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LEBLANC J.A. GOYETTE J.A. BETWEEN: JOHN TURMEL Appellant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on September 26, 2023. Judgment delivered at Toronto, Ontario, on September 28, 2023. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LEBLANC J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DE MONTIGNY J.A. GOYETTE J.A. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LEBLANC, J.A. J: [1] This is an appeal of a decision of the Federal Court, per Fothergill J. (the Application Judge), made pursuant to section 40 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 (the Act). In his decision (the Decision), the Application Judge declared the appellant to be a vexatious litigant and, as contemplated by paragraph 40(1) of the Act, prohibited the appellant from instituting new proceedings in that Court, or continuing previously instituted proceedings, except with leave of the Court. The Application Judge also saw fit to impose on the appellant additional measures to regulate his conduct before the Federal Court, such as requiring that any application for leave the appellant may bring to institute or continue a proceeding demonstrate that all outstanding costs awards made against him in the Federal Court have been paid in full, or prohibiting the appellant from aiding or abetting others to initiate proceedings before that Court. JCT: The exact order of Fothergill is: 5. Mr. Turmel is prohibited from assisting others with any proceedings before this Court, including by filing materials, or purporting to represent them, or communicating with the Court on their behalf. JCT: So it's not just to initiate proceedings but to assist others at all. I'd bet that's never been done. J: [2] As pointed out by the Application Judge, the concept of vexatiousness within the context of section 40 of the Act does not have a precise meaning but as this Court stated, "it is best not to be precise" (Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42, at para. 32 (Olumide)). However, there is ample jurisprudential guidance - or hallmarks - as to what this concept entails. These "hallmarks", which come in "many shapes and sizes", include the following: a) being admonished by various courts for engaging in vexatious and abusive behaviour; b) instituting frivolous proceedings (including motions, applications, actions and appeals); c) making scandalous and unsupported allegations against opposing parties of the Court; d) re-litigating issues which have already been decided against the vexatious litigant; e) bringing unsuccessful appeals of interlocutory and final decisions as a matter of course; f) ignoring court orders and court rules; and g) refusing to pay outstanding costs awards against the vexatious litigant. (Olumide v. Canada, 2016 FC 1106 at paras. 9-10, cited in Olumide, at para. 34) [3] Here, the Application Judge was satisfied that the appellant has exhibited all these hallmarks (Decision at para.38). JCT: All the hallmarks! J: More particularly, he noted that the appellant "has instituted numerous meritless and repetitive proceedings before [the Federal Court], the Federal Court of Appeal, the Ontario Courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada", "brought proceedings for improper purposes, frequently sought to re- litigate matters decided previously, made scandalous allegations against members of the courts and other parties, refused to follow the Federal Courts Rules, and failed to pay costs orders" (Decision at paras. 3, 5) [reference omitted]. JCT: I asked them: Who believes the Court would let someone refuse to follow the rules? J: [4] The Application Judge further noted that the appellant has instituted, since 1980, at least 67 court proceedings, JCT: 1.6 court proceedings a year. Ouch. How overwhelming! J; that he did so on a wide range of issues (banking, elections, gaming, libel, cannabis and COVID-19), JCT: Any one feel like laughing at the frivolity of (banking, elections, gaming, libel, cannabis and COVID-19)? J: and that virtually all of them "have been dismissed as failing to disclose reasonable causes of action, JCT: No cause of action is a standard judicial cop out. From Google: Cause of action is the legal claim [a claim that sometimes goes unstated] that allows a party to seek judicial relief. [1] This gives the legal right to seek a remedy because of the act or omission, failure to perform duty, or breach of obligation of the defendant towards the plaintiff. JCT: I like to call it Cause of Anger. How I was harmed. So no cause of anger about: - usury taking from the poor to give to the rich; - zero free-time in quantitatively equitable political broadcasts; - being busted for playing Blackjack and Poker; - being libelled by low-tech Dragons Den losers; - being prohibited from using the best natural medication; - being tricked into lockdowns and vax to get out. None of these are to get angry about. No cause of anger. No cause of action. They did say: we can't be judging past decisions that ruled all these issues were not reasonable causes of action. J: as wholly unsupported by evidence, JCT: To judges with their eyes closed. J: as attempts to relitigate matters previously decided, JCT: Only trying to find a judge who doesn't think getting zero time is quantitatively equitable and fair. J: or as otherwise frivolous and vexatious and abuses of process" (Decision at paras. 8-9). JCT: Anyone find those life-and-death topics frivolous like the judges did? Especially with 40 million dead poor people over the past 40 years, the thousands who suffered without herbal medication; only millions suffering adverse effects and death from the lockdowns and not safe and effective vax! Let's all laugh over the corpses with the judges who ruled trying to stop it frivolous and vexations and an abuse of process! J: [5] The Application Judge also pointed to the fact that since 2014, the appellant has prepared and distributed "litigation kits" comprising templates for initiating legal claims, JCT: I was using "litigation kits" helping people fight their bank foreclosures in the 1980s, and helping people defend their marijuana charges since 2000. J: that these kits were used by other litigants to file roughly 770 substantially identical claims challenging various aspects of Canada's medical cannabis regulatory regime, that the appellant encouraged the use of his litigation kits to "flood the courts", JCT: Judge Manson cancelled the medication to 18,000 patients and showing them how to ask to get them back means the court should have been flooded with 18,000 plaintiffs, not just 400. J: and that nearly all of them "have been dismissed or are in the process of being dismissed as failing to disclose reasonable causes of action, or as otherwise frivolous, vexatious or abuses of process" (Decision at paras. 25-28). JCT: Boy, won't those judges going to have a hot time running into their victims in the afterlife? Har har har. Imagine if every soul ends up in the same place? J:L [6] Finally, it is important to underscore that the appellant has neither challenged the evidence relied on by the respondent in his application under section 40 of the Act, nor adduced any evidence of his own (Decision at para. 5). JCT: It seems pretty obvious that most issues I raised were of life-and-death national import. Sad the judges were busy laughing! J: [7] It is trite that decisions made on motions brought under section 40 of the Act are discretionary in nature (Feeney v. Canada, 2022 FCA 190, at para. 4 (Feeney); Olumide at para. 23). Therefore, in order to intervene in such matters, this Court must be satisfied that the Federal Court erred on a question of law or committed a palpable and overriding error on a question of fact or of mixed fact and law (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 23; Hospira Healthcare Corporation v. Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology, 2016 FCA 215). The palpable and overriding error standard is a highly deferential one; the Court will only interfere with a decision under appeal where an error is obvious and affected the outcome of the case (Benhaim v. St-Germain, 2016 SCC 48, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 352 at para. 38; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401 at paras. 55-56, 69-70; Contact Lens King Inc. c. Canada, 2022 CAF 154 at paras. 76, 84). JCT: Legalese for why it was right to declare me a vexatious litigant for making the judge laugh at my frivolity. J: [8] Before this Court, both in his written submissions and at the hearing, the appellant has attempted to show that the court proceedings he has brought so far have merits and are neither vexatious nor frivolous and that it was therefore an error on the part of the Application Judge to conclude otherwise. JCT: Bingo. That's my Wild Card. J: [9] However, this approach is fundamentally flawed. As indicated to the appellant at the hearing of this appeal, and as pointed out by the respondent in its written submissions, we are well past the stage where the court decisions in the appellant's prior cases can be questioned. JCT: Get that? They can't question the judges who found putting farmers out of work in a world that's starving frivolous, judges who found zero time a quantitatively equitable share; judges who found marijuana could not prevent illnesses it was good for once you got them; judges who didn't think warning the world Covid was a false alarm needing no lockdowns or vax mandates was serious. Judges who screw up can't be questioned. Actually, that's not true. A judge can always do justice and then take the heat if it contradicts and judge who was wrong. J: Put another way, it was not open to the Application Judge - and it is even less open to this Court- to embark in some sort of review as to whether these decisions were right or wrong. The proper course for the appellant to challenge those decisions was to appeal them, something he has done in many instances, albeit unsuccessfully. JCT: So no help when millions of corpses are too frivolous for appellate courts to hear the appeal. J: [10] These decisions were therefore part of the factual matrix upon which the respondent's application under section 40 of the Act needed to be determined. The Application Judge considered that factual matrix in light of the jurisprudential guidelines developed in vexatious litigants' misbehaviour matters and I see no error on his part-be it on the law or on the application of the law to the facts, which, as indicated above, is only fatal in presence of a palpable and overriding error-that would justify this Court's intervention. JCT: Nothing they can do because previous courts found all the corpses funny. J: [11] The appellant insisted at the hearing that he had good intentions in bringing all these claims. However, this, in and of itself, is no bar to the application of section 40 of the Act if a party "litigate(s) in a way that implicates section 40's purposes" (Olumide at para.33; Feeney at para. 25). This is what the Application Judge found to be the case here, and once again, I see no basis upon which to interfere with his findings. JCT: Failed to see... J: [12] Respecting the additional measures imposed on the appellant, the Application Judge correctly pointed out that the Federal Court has "plenary jurisdiction to impose additional requirements as may be necessary to prevent abuses of process" and that some litigants may require different measures and restrictions, including safeguards to "discourage them from finding other ways to continue their vexatious conduct" (Decision at paras. 49-50). JCT: But prove the vexatious conduct first. J: [13] There is again ample evidence on record supporting the Application Judge's conclusion that additional restrictions were appropriate in the case at bar, be it the number of meritless claims advanced by the appellant, his tendency to re-litigate these matters, his failure to pay costs orders, his recruitment of others to "flood the courts" with his "litigation kits", or his derogatory statements on members of the judiciary on social media. JCT: It does depend if the previous judges were wrong. J: [14] It is useful at this point, in order to put the Decision in its proper perspective, to remind what this Court said, in Olumide, about what section 40 of the Act strives to achieve: [17] Section 40 reflects the fact that the Federal Courts are community property that exists to serve everyone, not a private resource that can commandeered in damaging ways to advance the interests of one. [18] As community property, courts allow unrestricted access by default: anyone with standing can start a proceeding. But those who misuse unrestricted access in a damaging way must be restrained. In this way, courts are no different from other community properties like public parks, libraries, community halls and museums. [19] The Federal Courts have finite resources that cannot be squandered. Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a moment unavailable to a deserving litigant. The unrestricted access to courts by those whose access should be restricted affects the access of others who need and deserve it. Inaction on the former damages the latter. JCT: What about every moment devoted to hundreds of litigants? J: [15] Finally, I note that the Application Judge declined to impose a further restriction on the appellant by extending his order, as sought by the respondent, to proceedings in this Court as he was left with some doubt whether he had that authority. Having said that, the Application Judge suggested that in the event of an appeal of the Decision, this Court "may wish to provide further guidance on this jurisdictional question" (Decision at para.54). As the appellant has since been declared a vexatious litigant in this Court by order dated June 15, 2023 (reported at 2023 FCA 140), I am of the view that we should forgo that invitation because this is no longer a live issue in this case. [16] On a purely procedural standpoint, the appellant has incorrectly named the respondent in this appeal as "Her Majesty the Queen". He should have named the respondent as the Attorney General of Canada, who was the applicant in the Federal Court proceeding that led to the Decision. The style of cause in this appeal should therefore be amended accordingly. [17] I would therefore dismiss the appeal, with costs to the respondent in a fixed amount of $750.00, disbursements included. JCT: Crown asked for $1,800 in costs. So a thousand cheaper is an interesting result. "Rene LeBlanc" J.A. "I agree Yves de Montigny J.A." "I agree Nathalie Goyette J.A." APPEARANCES: John C. Turmel FOR THE APPELLANT (ON HIS OWN BEHALF) Jon Bricker Addison Leigh FOR THE RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Shalene Curtis-Micallef Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT JCT: So I'll appeal to the Supreme Court which has little chance. Remember, they chose not to warn Canadians that Covid was a false alarm needing no vax and the vax is still being pushed.